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ABSTRACT
This article presents the results of a questionnaire survey sent
to a sample of automobile manufacturers in the United States
and Japan (including Japanese-managed plants in the United
States) during the spring of 1990. The research sought
information on the number of suppliers used for particular
components, supplier selection criteria, supplier involvement in
product development, pricing practices and changes over time,
as well as reported levels of defects and changes in defect
rates over time. The data support observations that Japanese
and U.S. practices tend to differ in key areas and Japanese
suppliers perform better in dimensions such as quality (defects)
and prices (meeting targets, reducing prices over time); and
that Japanese-managed auto plants established in the United
States have, in general, adopted Japanese practices and receive
extremely high levels of quality from Japanese as well as U.S.
suppliers. These findings provide evidence that Japanese
practices and performance levels are transferable outside Japan
and suggest that considerable improvements are possible for
U.S. suppliers supplying U.S. auto plants. In addition, the
survey indicates that U.S. firms have adopted at least some
practices traditionally associated with Japanese firms,
apparently reflecting some convergence toward Japanese
practices and higher performance levels in supplier management.
1. Introduction
Supplier management remains a critical area of operations for many firms,
especially those that subcontract large portions of components design,
production, or assembly and thus become heavily dependent on the engineering,
manufacturing, and delivery capabilites of outside organizations. An automobile,
for example, contains approximately 15,000 components. Since automakers
choose not to produce many of these in-house, managers in this industry have
faced critical strategic issues of whether to promote long-term relationships and
mutual cooperation with suppliers extending from product development to
manufacturing or rely on shorter-term contracts and competitive bidding, as
well as more in-house development and manufacturing, in an attempt to lower
final costs (Abernathy 1979; Monteverde and Teece 1982).
Japanese automobile producers have provided especially interesting cases to
examine management practices because of the degree of their reliance on
suppliers, high levels of performance, and the gradual globalization of
production operations. Among the leading Japanese auto producers in the late
1980s, suppliers (including non-consolidated subsidiaries) accounted for as much
as 70% of manufacturing costs (Cusumano 1985, 1988) as well as over half of
the engineering hours required for new product development (Clark 1989;
Fujimoto 1989). Effective supplier management and supplier contributions also
have been frequently cited as key factors in Japanese cost and quality
advantages over U.S. competitors, in autos and other industries (Cole 1979;
Ishikawa 1981; National Academy of Engineering 1982; Altshuler et al. 1984; Cole
and Yakushiji 1984; Imai, Nonaka, and Takeuchi 1985; Cusumano 1985; Clark,
Chew, and Fujimoto 1987; Mitsubishi Research Institute 1987; Asanuma 1988a,
1988b; Dertouzos, Lester, and Solow 1989; Nishiguchi 1989). But, while the
Japanese appear to have relied more extensively on outside suppliers than U.S.
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automakers, with positive rather than negative results, Japanese automakers that
moved production operations to the United States during the 1980s faced the
new challenge of receiving from U.S.-based suppliers equivalent levels of
reliability in quality, prices, and delivery. U.S. automakers also appeared to be
improving cost and quality levels as well as adopting some Japanese practices
for supplier management (Asanuma 1988b; Helper 1989a; Lamming 1989; Sabel et
al. 1989).
This article presents the results of a questionnaire survey sent to a sample
of automobile manufacturers in the United States and Japan (including Japanese-
managed plants in the United States) during the spring of 1990. The research
sought information on practices such as the number of suppliers used for
particular components, supplier selection criteria, and supplier involvement in
product development, as well as reported performance levels, such as price
targets and price changes over time, and defect rates and their change over
time. The study pursued three general questions: (1) Did reported differences
in supplier-management practices and performance appear in a comparison of
Japanese auto plants with U.S. auto plants for an identical set of components?
(2) For the same set of components, did significant differences appear between
the Japanese and U.S. factories in comparison with the Japanese-managed
production facilities in the United States, known as the "transplants?" And (3)
what did these comparisons indicate regarding variations in supplier management
and performance levels? We were especially interested in comparing U.S.
and Japanese suppliers, including U.S. firms that supplied components to
Japanese-managed plants in the United States.
Section 2 reviews existing literature that compares supplier relationships in
the United States and Japan and introduces the issues explored through the
questionnaire survey. Section 3 discusses the survey methodology, questions,
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and sample characteristics. Section 4 discusses the results of statistical
analyses of the collected data. Section 5 summarizes the major findings of the
survey. Section 6 concludes with implications from the study as well as
outlines directions for further inquiry in light of the limitations of the present
research. The appendices contain additional information on the sample as well
as a discussion of the sensitivity and reliability of the data.
In brief, the research supports observations that Japanese and U.S.
practices tend to differ in key areas, with Japanese suppliers performing better
in quality (defects) and prices (meeting targets, reducing prices over time); and
that Japanese-managed auto plants established in the United States have, in
general, adopted Japanese practices and persuaded or helped Japanese suppliers
in the United States and U.S. suppliers to meet Japanese standards for quality
and pricing. These findings suggest that considerable improvements are possible
for U.S. firms supplying U.S. auto plants. In addition, the survey provides
evidence that U.S. automakers and suppliers have adopted at least some
practices traditionally associated with the Japanese, thus indicating some
convergence toward a "Japanese model" of supplier management and higher
general levels of performance.
2. Reported Differences in Practice and Performance
To identify potential structural and policy differences among the three
groups of plants -- U.S.-owned factories in the U.S., Japanese-owned factories
in the U.S., and Japanese-owned factories in Japan -- we reviewed literature
comparing Japanese and U.S. approaches to supplier management. This section
summarizes the major observations.
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Number and Type of Suppliers
A common point made by various researchers has been that the degree of
vertical integration, or the percentage of components manufacturing, assembly,
and even product development done in house, differed between automakers in
the two countries. American automakers, with the exception of Chrysler,
appeared to be more vertically integrated than the Japanese. For example,
General Motors (GM) had 13 internal parts divisions and Ford had 7; these
produced a broad assortment of parts, while Japanese automakers and Chrysler
purchased nearly all parts from outside except a few critical components such
as engines, transmissions, axles, and large stamped parts. Depending on the
measures used, in-house production ratios ranged from 43% to 70% for GM, 36%
to 50% for Ford, and 26% to 30% for Japanese automakers (Cusumano 1985, 1988;
Temple, Barker, and Sloane 1987; Mitsubishi Research Institute 1987; Helper
1989a). Yet, despite their higher ratio of sourcing outside the parent company,
the Japanese appeared to rely on many fewer parts suppliers than their U.S.
counterparts. For example, according to a 1988 study, more than 5,500 firms
supplied semi-finished materials to GM, compared to approximately 170 to 320 at
Toyota, Nissan, and Mazda in Japan. At the plant level, the number of
suppliers ranged from as many as 800 for a typical GM assembly plant to
approximately 100 for a Japanese plant (Asanuma 1988b).
Thus, while Japanese automakers had fewer suppliers, they appeared to
have longer-term as well as closer relations over all with this smaller number
of firms (including integration of suppliers with factory production systems
through "just-in-time" deliveries, extensive information exchanges, and
cooperation in product development). In addition, Japanese suppliers appeared
to be organized more in a pyramid structure, with suppliers having different
levels of their own suppliers, whereas U.S. automakers seemed to buy more
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lower-level components as well as have several suppliers for each component
that management chose by competitive bidding (Altshuler et al. 1984; Cusumano
1985, 1988; Helper 1989a, 1989b; Asanuma 1988b; Nishiguchi 1989; Mitsubishi
Research Institute 1987; Lamming 1989). The largest Japanese automakers also
sourced approximately 50% of manufacturing costs to affiliated suppliers in
which they had a minimum 20% equity investment (see Cusumano 1985, 1988).
This brought their informal levels of vertical integration (in-house production
plus sourcing to affiliates) to about 75% of manufacturing costs.
Length and Stability of Relationships
Numerous studies indicated that the relationships between buyers and
suppliers in the Japanese auto industry tended to be longer term and more
stable than in the U.S. industry. Cusumano (1985), for example, recounted how
the largest Japanese automakers, after making most of their materials and parts
themselves when they first began producing automobiles in the 1930s,
established suppliers and supplier organizations prior to World War II to help
them expand production and then continued to cultivate close relationships after
the war as output levels rose dramatically. According to Asanuma (1988a,
1988b), Japanese automakers continued to utilize a select group of suppliers in
the late 1980s as well as maintain contracts with these firms for particular
components until the automaker altered the components through full model
changes (usually once every four years in Japan) or minor model changes
(generally every two years).
Japanese automakers also seemed to continue purchasing new components
from the same suppliers after the model changes, although without formal
guarantees of extending their contracts beyond the initial two or four years. In
addition, Japanese automakers appeared to select their suppliers through
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competitive bids in the product-development stage (at which point the buyers
had alternative sources) and then rate suppliers periodically by the value of
their products (for example, quality and price), continuing business contacts
with those who scored high (Asanuma 1988a, 1988b; Nishiguchi 1989). In the
United States, automakers reportedly set contracts for one year at a time and
tried to locate the least expensive suppliers through annual competitive bidding
(Asanuma 1988b, Lamming 1989). In a few exceptional cases, large parts
manufacturers supplying system components received implicit long-term
commitments, but it was not unheard of for automakers to renege on these
implicit contracts (Helper 1989a; also, see White 1971).
Role in Product Development
Researchers have categorized the role of suppliers in product development
into three modes: (1) suppliers that develop parts on their own as standard
products (supplier proprietary parts); (2) suppliers that do the detailed
engineering for parts based on functional specifications provided by automakers
(black-box parts); and (3) suppliers that produce parts developed by automakers
according to the buyer's detailed specifications (detail-controlled parts).
According to a research project at the Harvard Business School, there was a
sharp contrast between Japanese and U.S. practices according to these
categories. Among a sample of projects at Japanese automakers, black-box
parts accounted for 62% of all components (measured as a percentage of total
procurement costs), with approximately 50% of the product engineering carried.
out by suppliers, whereas automakers in the United States undertook 86% of the
engineering, using detail-controlled parts for 81% of their components (Clark
1989; Fujimoto 1989).
It follows that Japanese suppliers seemed to become involved in product
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development earlier than their U.S. counterparts. Asanuma (1988b), for example,
observed that Japanese black-box parts suppliers begin to participate in the
development process before the automakers had detailed specifications for their
models (about 24 months before starting commercial production of the new
model), while at Ford, supplier involvement began 6 to 18 months prior to
production. Along with long-standing relationships and constant competitive
pressure, development practices in Japan also appeared to push suppliers to
make a greater commitment to technological improvement, giving Japanese
automakers more effective product development than the U.S. counterparts. In
fact, Clark (1989) estimated that supplier involvement in product development
and strong supplier relationships accounted for one-third of a significant
Japanese advantage in total engineering hours required to develop a new
automobile (1,155 in Japan, compared to 3,478 in the;United States), and four to
five months of the Japanese advantage in lead time, the number of months
required to complete and deliver a new product (43 months in Japan, compared
to 62 months in the United States).
Pricing Practices
Pricing practices drew attention as an area that constituted perhaps the
most striking operational differences in purchasing behavior between U.S. and
Japanese auto producers. Traditionally, American automakers seemed to rely on
direct market forces among suppliers (competitive bidding), and the Japanese
more on subtle and indirect forms of competition, utilizing what the Japanese
have called "target pricing." Japanese automakers reportedly set a target price
for each part based upon the sales price for the new car model, and then urged
and helped suppliers reach their targets. For example, buyers and suppliers
jointly evaluated ways to reduce part prices step by step to the target while
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keeping required specifications constant. They also used various techniques to
study product designs, materials, and manufacturing methods to reduce
systematically the costs of parts in development (Cole and Yakushiji 1984;
Nishiguchi 1989).
Researchers observed another distinction in pricing after starting
commercial production. Automakers in Japan reportedly negotiated semi-annual
reductions in part prices throughout the model life-cycle, based on the notion
that suppliers should be able to reduce their costs through experience and
continual efforts to improve their product designs, materials, and manufacturing
methods. In the United States, on the other hand, researchers have not found
continuous price reductions. Though U.S. automakers used price bidding to
pressure suppliers to lower prices, they also seemed to allow suppliers to pass
wage and other cost increases back to the buyers for as long as the contract
continued (Asanuma 1988b; Lamming 1989).
Quality Management
A study by the Japan Automobile Manufacturers Associations of parts
imported from American suppliers and parts made in Japan showed that the
defect rates for U.S. imports was 0.35% to 2.6%, considerably higher than parts
from Japanese suppliers in Japan (0% to 0.01%) (Mitsubishi Research Institute
1987). Because the level of defects was close to zero, Japanese automakers
generally did not inspect incoming parts and thus saved on inspection labor and
well as components' costs, which could rise with large amounts of defects.
Various authors have attributed this level of quality performance to management
practices that required suppliers to examine, on a continual basis, defects found
in designs, materials, and manufacturing methods, customer responses to
products, employee training and involvement in problem solving, and other areas
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of operations (Cole 1979; Cusumano 1985; Sei 1989; Nishiguchi 1989).
Reported management policies for quality in U.S. firms differed
considerably from reported Japanese approaches. Not only were U.S. defect
levels higher for components and finished products, but U.S. firms seemed to
rely more on the detection of errors after-the-fact rather than prevention of
problems, with less systematic efforts to learn from their experiences with
defective parts. They also appeared to tolerate wide variances by suppliers and
centralize responsibility for quality in quality control and inspection staff rather
than diffuse this responsibility among all employees (Temple, Barker, and Sloane
1987; Helper 1989a).
Information Exchanges and Suggestions
Mutual information exchanges and problem-solving through suggestions
from the Japanese automakers to suppliers appeared to stem from the stability
and closeness of relationships, active participation of suppliers in product
development, as well as effective cost and quality management practices in
general. Several researchers elaborated on reported differences between U.S.
and Japanese firms.
The Harvard researchers documented information exchanges in various
phases of product development, finding that Japanese auto projects overlapped
more activities and exchanged information more frequently through formal and
informal mechanisms (Clark, Chew, and Fujimoto 1987; Clark 1989; Fujimoto
1989). Helper (1989a) identified two types of responses to problems arising in a
buyer-supplier relationship and measured them along two dimensions, the degree
of administrative coordination and the degree of commitment. In what she
termed the exit system, the buyer's response to problems with a supplier is to
find a new supplier; this requires low commitment and low administrative
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coordination. In the voice system, the buyer works with the original supplier
until a problem is corrected; this requires high commitment, high administrative
coordination, and a rich flow of information. Helper argued that the dual
system of vertical integration and exit-based relations with outside suppliers
gave American automakers strong bargaining power but did not encourage most
types of technological advance. Nishiguchi (1989) described the Japanese
"problem-solving" orientation as opposed to the "bargaining" orientation of
American firms, noting that Japanese suppliers pursued continuous cost
reductions and quality improvement through a range of new inter-firm practices.
These included the making of numerous suggestions to suppliers that focused on
techniques to improve designs, materials, and manufacturing methods, as well as
on target costs, early involvement in development, extensive use of black-box
parts, grading of suppliers, and sending resident engineers to supplier locations.
Summary
Although this review covers only recent publications, it is clear that
researchers have already identified numerous potential differences, with
important implications for performance, between Japanese and U.S. practices for
managing suppliers in product development as well as manufacturing. Table 1
summarizes the areas discussed. It should be noted again, however, that the
automobile industry appeared to be dynamic rather than static, with U.S.
producers possibly moving closer to Japanese practices, while Japanese producers
established U.S. plants that required them to manage U.S. suppliers.
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Table 1: Reported Differences in U.S.-Japanese Supplier Management
Dimension
Number of Suppliers
Types of Suppliers
Length of Relationships
Length of Contracts
Length of Part Transactions
Selection Criteria
Role in Development
Pricing Practices
Price Changes
Defect Rates
Quality Improvement
Information Exchanges
Suggestions to Suppliers
U.S.
Many
Many in-house
Shorter
Shorter
1 year
Price
Smaller
Competitive
Upwa rd
Higher
Lower
Lower
Few
bids
Japanese
Fewer
Many affiliated
Longer
Longer
2 or 4 years
(model life-cycle)
Quality, price, etc.
Larger
Target prices
Downward
Lower
Higher
Higher
Many
Sou rces: References in Section 2 of this article.
Existing research based on quantitative data and statistical comparisons
also had limitations. For example, Cusumano (1985, 1988) measured vertical
integration but only provided historical descriptions of supplier-management
practices. The Harvard group (Clark, Chew, and Fujimoto 1987; Clark 1989;
Fujimoto 1989) focused on product development and supplier involvement, rather
than explore the details of supplier-management practices in general. Mitsubishi
Research Institute (1987) provided quantitative data on various dimensions but
relied on small samples of interviews and secondary sources, with no statistical
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analyses, as did Altshuler et al. (1984), Cole and Yakushiji (1984), Temple,
Barker, and Sloane (1987), Asanuma (1988a, 1988b), Lamming (1989), and Sei
(1989). Nishiguchi (1989) collected some primary data but primarily on the
flexibility of suppliers' manufacturing systems, again with no statistical analysis.
Helper (1989b), while analyzing a broad set of quantitative data on supplier
relationships, only covered facilities in the United States.
3. Survey Methodology and Sample Characteristics
To collect quantitative data on the areas listed in Table 1 and then
compare supplier management practices and performance between Japanese and
U.S. plants as well as with Japanese factories in the United States, from
January to March 1990 we carried out a questionnaire survey of auto
manufacturers in the United States and Japan. In addition, to aid in
formulating and interpreting the survey data, during January and February 1990,
we conducted interviews and discussed the research topic with approximately 60
managers at three U.S. automakers, four Japanese transplants, and 23 Japanese
suppliers in the United States.1
Analyzing suppliers in this manner presented difficulties that have placed
limitations on this study. It is problematic, for example, to generalize about
practices and performance because of the huge number and variety of parts
needed to build an automobile. Relationships also may differ for each car model
even with the same companies. The difficulty of collecting time-series data
creates problems in interpreting the results of questions directed at one model
life-cycle; areas with no significant differences between Japanese and U.S.
practices or performance levels could thus provide evidence either for
1 For further details on the Japanese interviews, see Takeishi 1990: 55-64.
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convergence or the inaccuracy of reported differences. These and other
problems are discussed later in this article, although, in general, the questions
asked and the data gathered appeared adequate to explore whether differences
existed in several key dimensions among the three groups of auto plants
surveyed.
Units of Analysis
Before selecting components to compare, interviews and analysis of other
research suggested that we adopt several criteria to insure comparability of the
data. First, we believed the survey should examine a variety of parts, to
reduce the possibility of idiosyncratic answers dependent on the type of part
(we also conducted statistical tests, discussed in the text and in Appendix 2, to
see if the data were sensitive to the part type). We thus considered black-box
parts (detailed design done by suppliers) and detail-controlled parts (detailed
designs done by the automakers), as well as components for the exterior and
interior of a vehicle, and parts made of metal, electrical, and plastic materials.
Second, we decided to exclude parts, such as engines and transmissions, that
Japanese transplants were mainly importing from Japan. Third, we decided to
exclude parts that American automakers usually produced internally. After
these considerations, we chose four kinds of parts: shock absorbers, front seat
assemblies, gauge (meter) assemblies, and instrument panels. Table 2 lists the
data collected in the survey for these four components.
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Table 2: Data Collected in the Questionnaires
Question#
1.1
1.2
1.3
2
3
4
5
6.1
6.2
7.1
7.2
7.3
8.1
8.2
9.1
9.2
Dimension
Model market segment (subcompact, compact, mid-size, full-size)
Model production volume
Model year (time of market introduction)
Number of suppliers
Types of suppliers (internal division, affiliated, independent)
Length of contract and business relations
Frequency of changing suppliers
Supplier selection criteria
Role of suppliers in product development
Stage of supplier involvement in development
Target price ratio
Price change rate
Rationale behind price increase/decrease
Defect rate
Defect rate change over time
Information possessed by the buyers about suppliers
Suggestions made by the buyers to suppliers
Note: #See Takeishi 1990: 71-78 for the actual survey questions.
Table 3: Sample Description
Key: SA = shock absorber; GG =
IP = instrument panel
gauge assembly; ST = front seat assembly;
Automakers Models Parts Analyzed
Group Reported
Contacted Responding SA GG ST IP Total
U.S. 3 2 (66%) 11 7 2 7 6 22
Japan/U.S.# 6 5 (83%) 6 6 6 6 6 24
Japanese 5 3 (60%) 7 7 7 7 6 27
Total 13 10 (71%) 24 20 15 20 18 73
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Notes: #Japanese-managed transplants, which include two joint ventures with
American automakers.
##Profiles of models reported are shown in Appendix 1.
The Sample
To fill out the survey, we approached the three U.S.-based automakers
(GM, Ford, and Chrysler), the five largest Japanese automakers (Toyota, Nissan,
Honda, Mitsubishi, and Mazda), and six Japanese transplants in the United
States managed by the same Japanese firms. We identified one manager
responsible for purchasing and product planning in each firm and asked them to
fill out a questionnaire for one or more models, with a promise of
confidentiality such that no data would be associated with particular firms.
Each respondent decided the number of models and which models to include.
The survey, therefore, reflects not a random sample but data on four
components we selected for models chosen by managers at the largest
automakers in the United States and Japan. These data may also represent
their "best practices" or practices on models for which the managers had
sufficient information to answer the questionnaire.
Table 3 summarizes the response rate and other characteristics of the
sample. One U.S. firm and two Japanese firms chose not to respond. Upon
reviewing the survey results, several questionnaires also contained incomplete or
unclear answers; these were returned to the respondents, who then sent
corrected surveys back to us. Another difficulty was that many managers,
especially from the U.S. firms, did not collect data for all four parts. For
example, there are only two responses for gauge assemblies in the U.S. sample,
although the other three parts are more evenly balanced across the three
groups. Statistical tests further indicated that the type of part was not a
significant variable, except in a few cases as noted later or in Appendix 2.
As seen in Table 2, the questionnaire also collected information on each
model's market segment, production volume, and year of introduction as control
variables to determine if the size, customer focus, or newness of the automobile
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had any impact on the responses. Once again, these factors were insignificant
except in a few cases, as noted were appropriate. In addition, for each
question, we asked respondents to list a degree of confidence in their answers;
as discussed in Appendix 2, only on one of 17 questions did the responses from
a group average out to be "not very confident."
4. Survey Results and Analysis
The data thus consist of responses to 17 questions regarding the four
components organized to compare three groups in the following order: U.S.-
based auto plants, Japanese-managed transplants in the United States
(abbreviated as "Japan/U.S."), and Japanese auto plants in Japan.
Number of Suppliers
Table 4 indicates the number of suppliers (including internal parts
divisions) per part for each model. In one case, a U.S. automaker procured
individual parts, rather a fully assembled seat, from 25 separate suppliers. In
all other cases, auto plants procured the four parts as subassemblies. Excluding
the exceptional case, the average number of suppliers per part is 1.8 for the
U.S. automakers, 1.2 for the Japanese transplants, and 1.3 for the Japanese
automakers. These differences are significant at the 1% and 5% levels, as
indicated. Though the number for the U.S. producers still exceeds those for
the other two groups, cases of procuring from only one supplier account for
59% of the U.S. sample. This suggests that U.S. automakers did limit the
number of suppliers per part, in contrast to reports that they always had many
suppliers for each component. In addition, 30% of the Japanese sample and 17%
of the transplants used two suppliers per part, indicating that Japanese firms
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did not always have sole sources for single components.
Type and Origin of Supplier
Table 5 compares supplier type by financial affiliation and country of
origin. Companies were asked to identify the key supplier for each part,
defined as the supplier that provided the largest percentage of the cost or
value of the part. The large number of categories and the relatively small
sample resulted in inconclusive statistical tests and thus it is not possible to
generalize about this variable. For this sample, nonetheless, the data indicate
that 50% of the major suppliers for the U.S. automakers were internal parts
divisions while 45% were independent U.S. suppliers; 5% (1 supplier) was from
West Germany. For the Japanese automakers responding to the survey, merely
7% of their suppliers were in-house divisions; 33% were affiliated firms (defined
as minimum 20% equity ownership) and nearly 60% were independent. These
numbers appear consistent with traditional views of higher levels of vertical
integration for U.S. automakers in contrast to more outside suppliers for the
Japanese. The responses from the Japanese transplants resembled the Japanese
responses in the low level of vertical integration, although the transplants made
slightly more components internally and utilized independent U.S. suppliers (38%
of suppliers), whereas the Japanese sample did not.
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Table 4: Number of Suppliers Per Part 2
Units: Frequency distributions and means for number of suppliers per part.
Percentages indicated in parentheses.
No. of U.S. Japan Japan Total
Suppliers /U. S.
1 13 20 19 52
(59.1) (83.3) (70.2) (71.2)
2 3 4 8 15
(13.6) (16.7) (29.6) (20.6)
3 3 0 0 3
(13.6) (0) (0) (4.1)
4 1 0 0 1
(13.6) (0) (0) (1.4)
5 1 0 0 1
(4.6) (0) (0) (1.4)
> 5 1# 0 0 1
(4.6) (0) (0) (1.4)'
Total 22 24 27 73
(100) (100) (100) (100)
Mean ab 2.8 1.2 1.3 1.7
Mean## a**b* 1.8 1.2 1.3 1.4
Notes: #Refers to the one automaker using 25 suppliers for the seat
assembly.
##The means calculated excluding the one exceptional case of 25
suppliers for the seat assembly.
a = U.S. and Japan/U.S. difference significant at the 10% level.
a** = U.S. and Japan/U.S. difference significant at the 1% level.
b = U.S. and Japan difference significant at the 10% level.
b* = U.S. and Japan difference significant at the 5% level.
2 The statistical test used to determine the differences among the two or
three means in this and other tables, except as noted, was the Fisher's PLSD
(Protected Least Significant Difference) test (Snedecor and Cochran 1986: 232-
236). For additional details of the statistical tests for this and other tables, as
well as the appendixes, see Takeishi 1990.
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Table 5: Type and Origin of Major Suppliers
Units: Frequency distribution of number of major suppliers#;
percentages in parentheses.
U.S. Japan Japan Total
/U.S.
Supplier Type/Location
Internal 10 3 2 15
(50) (12.5) (7.4) (21.1)
Affiliated## 0 1 9 14
/Japan (0) (4.7) (33.3) (19.7)
Affiliated 0 5 0 1
/U. S. A. (0) (20.8) (0) (1.4)
Independent 0 2 16 18
Japanese/Japan (0) (8.3) (59.3) (25.4)
Independent 0 4 0 4
Japanese/U.S.A. (0) (16.7) (0) (5.6)
Independent 9 9 0 18
U.S./U.S.A. (45) (37.5) (0) (25.4)
Other 1 0 0 1
(5) (0) (0) (1.4)
Supplier Origin/Location
U. S./U.S.A. 20 9 0 29
(100) (37.5) (0) (40.8)
Japanese/U.S.A. 0 12. 0 12
(0) (50) (0) (16.9)
Japanese/Japan 0 3 27 30
(0) (12.5) 100) (42.3)
Total 20 24 27 71
(100) (100) (100) (100)
major supplier is defined
the largest portion of a
automaker.
##An
here as the supplier that accounts for
part number by value procured by the
affiliated supplier is defined as one in which the automaker
owns at least 20% of the supplier's outstanding shares.
19
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Length of Contracts and Business Relationships
Table 6 indicates the length and stability of supplier relationships. First,
in terms of the average contract length, the U.S. sample is the shortest (1.7
years), followed by the Japanese transplants (2.5 years) and the Japanese (3.2
years), with the U.S.-Japan differences significant at the 1% level. The
frequency distribution, shown in Table 7, reveals that most U.S. contracts
(nearly 82%) in this sample are short-term (1 year). Japanese contracts covered
a broad range, from 6 months to 8 years, although the most common contract
(62% of the sample) is 4 years, corresponding to the average model life-cycle.
The Japanese transplants fell in between the U.S. and Japanese samples, with
50% 1-year contracts and 50% 4-year contracts, indicating somewhat of a
compromise between reported Japanese and U.S. practices.
Although contract length differs among the'three groups, the actual
duration of part purchases appears more uniform. As seen in Table 6, for each
group, the average duration of the part transaction (the length of time for
purchasing a particular part for a specific model from the same major supplier)
is almost equivalent to the model life-cycle (the model life-cycles were shorter
for the Japanese than the U.S. automakers but shortest for the transplants,
which in general had more recently introduced new models). Responses to a
question on how often the automakers changed suppliers are also consistent
with this finding. No automaker changed a supplier for the parts surveyed
after the model's market introduction. It is still possible U.S. automakers
conduct competitive bidding every year when their 1-year contracts end,
although interviews of the U.S. respondents who use 1-year contracts indicated
that, in 16 of 17 cases, they did not carry out any competitive bidding after
market introduction (Takeishi 1990). These results strongly suggest that,
although the average contract length for U.S. automakers is shorter than for
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Japanese automakers, the actual duration of purchasing parts for specific models
is as long and as stable as in Japan.
Table 6: Length of Contracts, Transactions, and Model Life-cycles
Units: years, number
parentheses
of times suppliers changed, number of observations in
U.S. Japan Japan Total
/U.S.
Length of 1.7 2.5 3.2 3.0
Contract b** (22) (16) (26) (64)
Length of Part 3.2 1.6 3.5 2.8
Transaction a *c (21) (24) (27) (72)
Length of MY,?:el 3.6 1.7 3.1 2.7
Life-cycle a c (20) (24) (27) (71)
No. of Times 0 0 0 0
Suppliers Changed (21) (24) (27) (72)
Notes: a* = U.S. and Japan/
a* = U.S. and Japan/
ba = U.S. and Japan
b* = Japan/U.S. and Japan
** = Japan/U.S. and
U.S. difference significant at the 5% level.
U.S. difference significant at the 1% level.
difference significant at the 1% level.
Japan difference significant at the 5% level.
Japan difference significant at the 1% level.
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Table 7: Length of Contracts
Unit: years, number of observations, percentages in parentheses
Contract Length U.S. Japan Japan Total
(years) /U.S.
0.5 0 0 3 3
(0) (0) (11.5) (4.7)
1 18 8 2 28
(81.8) (50.0) (7.7) (43.8)
2 0 0 4 4
(0) (0) (15.4) (6.2)
4 1 8 16 25
(4.6) (50) (61.5) (39.1)
5 3 0 0 3
(13.6) (0) (0) (4.7)
8 0 0 1 1
(0) (0) (3.9) (1.6)
Total Observations 22 16# 26 64
(100) (100) (100) (100)
Average Length b** 1.7 2.5 3.2 3.0
(years)
Notes: #Two Japanese transplants (8
,., transaction period in the
cases) do
contract.
not define the length of
Em = U.S. and Japan difference significant at the 1% level.
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A related issue is the total duration of the business relationships between
the automakers and their suppliers, including any part transactions for any
model (that is, for parts and models in addition to those described in the
questionnaire). As seen in Table 8, most of the relationships tended to be long
term, dispelling notions that U.S. automakers quickly changed suppliers. All the
Japanese relationships and 81.8% of the U.S. were more than ten years. 3 Only
the transplants tended to have short-term relationships, although this clearly
appeared due to their short history of operations, with all plants established
during the early or mid-1980s.
Table
Unit: years, number of
Relationship
(years)
<2
3 to 5
5 to 10
> 10
Total Observations
8: Length of Business Relationships
observations, percentages in parentheses
U.S. Japan Japan Total
/U.S.
0 6 0 6
(0) (26.1) (0) (8.3)
0 6 0 6
(0) (26.1) (0) (8.3)
4 6 0 10
(18.2) (26.1) (0) (13.9)
18 5 27 50
(81.8) (21.7) (100) (69.4)
22 23 27 72
(100) (100) (100) (100)
3 Even excluding the 12 cases where suppliers were internal divisions (for
U.S. automakers only), 80% of the cases (8) were for more than 10 years and
20% (2) were for 5 to 10 years.
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Supplier Selection Criteria
To examine potential criteria used to select suppliers for each of the four
parts, the questionnaire asked respondents to rate nine factors we selected in
the order listed in Table 9 on a five-point scale (5 = very important, 1 = not
important) or specify and rate other factors of their own choosing. The
results, rather surprisingly, indicate that, whereas common impressions of U.S.
automakers might have them place more emphasis on prices and costs rather
than quality and delivery capabilities, the Japanese respondents placed a higher
emphasis on initial prices offered and target-pricing capabilities in the
development process.
The largest gaps between the U.S. and Japanese responses were in the
importance of "past business experience with your company" and "financial
affiliation," factors that the U.S. firms valued more highly, although the larger
role of internal parts divisions for the U.S. producers in this sample (see Table
5) may explain why financial affiliations were more important for them than for
the Japanese. Other statistically significant differences were that Japanese
transplants consider "quality" and "manufacturing capability" more important
than do the Japanese automakers in this sample. All the transplant respondents
also rated quality as very important, perhaps reflecting their need to emphasize
this criterion with new suppliers, especially in the United States.
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Table 9: Supplier Selection Criteria
Units: Mean score (5-point scale, with 5 = very important and 1 = not
important), number of observations, standard deviations in parentheses
U.S. Japan Japan
/U.S.
Observations: 21 23 27
Criteria
Initial Price Offered b**c* 4.1 4.4 4.9
(1.0) (0.8) (0.3)
Target Price Capability a**b** 4.1 4.7 4.7
(0.8) (0.5) (0.5)
Cost Reduction Capability c 4.1 4.4 4.0
(1.0) (0.7) (0.9)
Quality (Conformance) c* 4.8 5.0 4.7
(0.4) (0) (0.5)
Delivery Capability 4.6 4.7 4.7
(1.0) (0.4) (0.6)
Design/Eng. Capability 4.6 4.7 4.6
(0.5) (0.7) (0.7)
Technological Capability 4.1 4.2 4.4
(0.8) (1.0) (0.8)
Manufacturing Capability 4.4 4.7 4.4
(0.6) (0.5) (0.8)
Past Business Relations a**b** 4.4 3.1 3.1
(0.8) (1.3) (1.1)
Financial Affiliation a**b** 3.8 1.9 2.1
(1.2) (1.2) (1.0)
Notes: a*b**
c*
= U.S. and Japan/U.S. difference significant at the 1% level.
= U.S. and Japan difference significant at the 1% level.
= Japan/U.S. and Japan difference significant at the 10% level.
= Japan/U.S. and Japan difference significant at the 5% level.
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Role of Suppliers in Development
Responses to a question regarding the role of suppliers in product
development indicated more similarities than differences. Most of the
components were treated as black-box parts, that is, with the automakers
providing only functional specifications and the suppliers doing the detailed
design. As seen in the Harvard reports (Clark, Chew, and Fujimoto 1987; Clark
1989; Fujimoto 1989), the Japanese (96%) used more black-box parts compared to
the U.S. sample (70%), while the U.S. firms used slightly more than the
transplants (64%). The U.S. firms used more detail-controlled parts (30%),
compared to none for the Japanese and 23% for the transplants. The Japanese
(4%) and the transplants (14%) also used more supplier-proprietary parts.
Nonetheless, due to the size and mix of the observations, the differences among
the three groups were not statistically significant '(for example, none of the
shock absorbers and gauge assemblies were detail-controlled parts, in contrast
to 57% of the instrument panels and 17% of the seat assemblies; and most of
the shock absorbers and seat and gauge assemblies were black-box parts).
With regard to the timing of supplier involvement in the development
process, the survey asked automakers how many months prior to the market
introduction of a model they sent out inquiries to suppliers and then selected
the suppliers to provide the components. These results, with one exception,
were not statistically different for the three groups even at a 10% significance
level. The exception was a difference between the transplants, which sent out
inquiries 33 months before model introduction, compared to 27 months for the
Japanese sample. The U.S. average of 30 months was not significantly different
from the other two averages. Overall, these results provide evidence either for
a misunderstanding of U.S.-Japanese differences or for a convergence of
practice between the U.S. and Japan, with suppliers in both countries playing a
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large role from an apparently early stage in development.
Pricing Practices
Two dimensions that literature and interviews suggested were important to
automakers were the target-price ratio and the price-change rate. The target
price ratio, as defined in the survey, consists of the actual part price at market
introduction of the model divided by the target price the automaker set when it
selected the major supplier for the part, expressed as a percentage. This
measures how well a supplier achieves the target price. The price change rate
refers to the average annual price change after market introduction.
Table 10 shows the average target price ratios and price change rates for
the three groups; both ratios display striking contrasts. Japanese automakers in
the sample started purchasing new parts at a price approximately 2% cheaper
than initially targeted and prices drop approximately 2% annually afterward. The
U.S. sample, in contrast, started purchasing new parts at a price approximately
9% higher than targeted and prices rise approximately 1% per year afterwards.
Japanese transplants, however, do not exhibit the same performance as the
Japanese. Their target price ratio is as high as the U.S. sample, and their
price-change rate falls in between the other two groups. 4
Figure 1 illustrates these distinctions more clearly. The Japanese are
concentrated in the lower-left quadrant (low target-price ratio and negative
price-change rate), whereas most of the U.S. cases are positioned in the
upper-right quadrant (high target-price ratio and positive price-change rate).
4 One reason for the high target-price ratio at the transplants appears to
be the role of suppliers in development. Three out of 18 observations for the
transplants were detail-controlled parts; these averaged a ratio of 128%, whereas
the means for supplier-proprietary parts (3 cases) and black-box parts (12 cases)
are 106.7 and 106.8, respectively. Even for black box parts, however, the target
price for the transplants was still higher than for the Japanese sample at a 5%
level of significance.
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Contrary to the observation of several previous studies that U.S. automakers
have recently started asking suppliers to reduce prices, the survey indicates
that, at least for this sample, prices were increasing.
The Japanese transplants were indistinguishable from the U.S. firms in
target-price ratios. Half of the suppliers to the transplants were also U.S.
firms, which in general did not meet target prices as well as the Japanese
suppliers. Nonetheless, the transplants performed somewhat better (significant
at the 10% level) than the U.S. sample in obtaining decreasing price changes
from U.S. suppliers, averaging a -0.6% (7 observations) drop compared to an
increase of 0.9% (13 observations) for the U.S. sample.5 (As noted in Table 5,
the Japanese models in this survey did not rely on U.S. suppliers.)
The questionnaire also requested reasons why prices of the four parts
increased or decreased after the model introduction by asking respondents to
check one or more of eight potential factors behind increases and one or more
of eleven factors for decreases. (The respondents could specify other reasons,
but generally did not). The large number of possible reasons and the relatively
small number of observations, as well as the fact that no Japanese firm
reported price increases while 25 reported price decreases, compared to only 2
U.S. firms, made it difficult to compare the results statistically, although
several trends stand out for description.
5 We analyzed both target-price ratios and price-change rates breaking
down suppliers by their origin and location (U.S. suppliers in the United States,
Japanese suppliers in the United States, or Japanese suppliers in Japan). These
results were not different at the 10% level of significance except for this one instance.
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Table 10: Pricing Practices
Units: Percentages, number of observations in parentheses
Practice U.S. Japan Japan Total
/U.S.
Targqt- Price 109.4 110.7 97.6 104.7
Ratio b¢'* (13) (19) (25) (57)
Pric-Chanae 0.9 -0.4 -2.1 -0.9
Rate ## a b c** (11) (16) (26) (53)
Notes: #Target-price ratio = (actual part price at market introduction )/(target price the automaker set when it selected the major
supplier for the part) * 100.
Price-change rate = the average annual rate of price change after
the market introduction (excluding the price change when the
part's design was changed due to the minor change of the
model).
a* = U.S. and Japan/U.S. difference significant at the 5% level.
b** = U.S. and Japan difference significant at the 1% level.
c = Japan/U.S. and Japan difference significant at the 1% level.
Figure 1: Target Price Ratio vs. Price Change Rate
* USA A TRANSPLANT OJAPAN
QCI-
w
I
PRICE CHANGE RATE ()
Note: Sample size: USA- 9, TRANSPLANT - 16, JAPAN- 25.
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The transplants that reported price increases (2 observations) attributed
these to rising materials costs; this factor was also cited by 83% of the U.S.
respondents (6 observations) to explain their increases, followed by process
changes and labor costs. By far the major source of price reductions was
productivity improvements, cited by 97% of all respondents (32 observations).
The other major factors behind price reductions were design changes (76% of
the sample), defect-rate improvements (52%), and process changes (42%).
Quality
Table 11 compares the current defect rate (the number of defective parts
as defined by the respondent divided by the number of parts received and
multiplied by 100 to express this as a percentage), and the annual average
defect-rate change after market introduction. Again, a marked contrast among
the three groups emerges. The Japanese automakers in this sample enjoyed a
decrease in the defect rate of approximately 10% per year as well as received
parts with the lowest defect rate (0.01%), significantly better than the U.S.
respondents. Defect rates for the U.S. automakers also decreased, but the pace
was relatively slow (2% annually) and the mean defect rate is still high (1.8%).
Though the average rate of decrease for the Japanese transplants (0.05%) was
not yet as low as the Japanese, it was also significantly better than the U.S.
rate.
In addition, the data indicate the transplants were improving much faster
than either the U.S. or Japanese respondents, with defect rates dropping more
than 30% since model introductions. The U.S. plants managed by the Japanese
automakers, therefore, were quickly approaching the Japanese defect levels,
even with their much greater use of U.S. suppliers. Figure 2 presents a graph
of these results. This shows that, while in no U.S. case did the defect rate
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improve by more than 10%, in spite of a relatively higher average defect rate,
most of the Japanese transplants and Japanese automakers have improved their
defect rates by more than 10%, even starting with lower defect rates than the
U.S. sample. It thus appears that U.S. automakers, at least in this survey, still
have difficulties matching the Japanese or their transplants in quality as
reflected in component defects.
We also analyzed these rates by the origin and location of suppliers. As
summarized in Table 12, a major difference (statistically significant at the 1%
level) appeared in the performance of U.S. suppliers when delivering to the
transplants, as opposed to the U.S. plants. U.S. suppliers provided
approximately 0.1% defects to the transplants compared to 1.8% to U.S. plants.
The U.S. suppliers also showed nearly a 49% decrease in defects, compared to
merely 1.7% when delivering to U.S. firms. Internal parts divisions appeared to
have the worst quality in the sample, although, due to the small number of
observations (4 defect rates and 5 for defect-rate changes), the results were
not significant statistically.
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Table 11: Defect Rates and Defect-Rate Changes
Units: percentages, number of observations in parentheses
U.S. Japan Japan Total
/U.S.
Defet* 1.81 0.05 0.01 0.44
Rate a*b** (12) (15) (25) (52)
Defect-JRate -1.7 -30.1 -9.5 -11.5
Change a*c** (9) (7) (25) (40)
Notes: #Defect rate = (the number of defective parts / the number of parts
received) * 100.
##Defect-rate change = the average annual rate of defect rate change
after market introduction.
a**= U.S. and Japan/U.S. difference significant at the 1% level.
b** = U.S. and Japan difference significant at the 1% level.
= Japan/U.S. and Japan difference significant at the 1% level.
Figure 2: Defect Rates vs. Defect-Rate Changes
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Table 12: Defect Rates
Units: percentages, number of
U.S.
and Changes by Supplier Origin
observations in parentheses
Japan Japan Total
/U.S.
Defect Rate#
American Supliers 1.81 0.11 - 1.25
in U.S.A. a (12) (6) (18)
Japanese Suppliers - 0.01 - 0.02
in U.S.A. (6) (6)
Japanese Suppliers - 0.01 0.01 0.01
in Japan (3) (25) (28)
Defect-Rate Change##
American Sup[pliers -1.7 -48.8 - -11.2
in U.S.A. a (8) (2) (10)
Japanese Suppliers - -31.1 - -31.1
in U.S.A. (3) (3)
Japanese Suppliers - -10.0 -9.5 -9.5
in Japan (2) (25) (27)
Notes: # See Table 11 for definition.
## ee Table 11 for definition.
a = U.S. and Japan/U.S. difference significant at the 1% level.
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Information and Suggestions
A final set of questions asked respondents to indicate either what type of
information on suppliers they possessed or what types of suggestions they have
given to suppliers. Using earlier studies as a guide (especially Mitsubishi
Research Institute 1987 and Fujimoto 1989), we selected eight categories for the
information question (production capacity, cost breakdown by general category,
breakdown of process steps, cost of each process step, quality control program,
statistical process control data, equipment used, and inventory level) and seven
for the suggestions question (quality control changes, production process
changes, cost reduction, design changes, material changes, equipment changes,
inventory control changes). Chi-square tests indicated several statistically
significant differences in how respondents from the three groups answered.
With regard to information exchange (Table 13), the Japanese auto plants
(37%) had more information on the cost of process steps, compared to both the
U.S. and Japanese/U.S. respondents, although no group reported high levels of
information in this area and the differences among the three were significant
only at the 10% level. The U.S. auto plants, on the other hand, had more
information on statistical process control (90.5% of respondents) than the
Japanese and Japanese/U.S. respondents (significant at the 5% level), which may
indicate a greater emphasis on this technique at the American firms. The U.S.
(85.7%) and Japanese (88.9%) auto plants also had more information on
equipment than the Japanese/U.S. transplants (52.2%), significant at the 5%
level, perhaps because of their longer relationships with suppliers. With regard
to suggestions made by the automakers to suppliers, the differences were more
dramatic among the three groups, with the Japanese and the transplants
reporting higher numbers for every category, with five categories statistically
different at the 1% to 10% levels (Table 14). These data indicate a much greater
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involvement with suppliers for nearly all aspects of the production process, and
nearly identical practices between the Japanese and the transplants, at least as
indicated by this survey.
Table 13: Information Possessed on Suppliers by Automakers
percentage indicating possession of information on
number of observations in parentheses
each category,
U.S. Japan Japan
/U.S.
(21) (23) (27)
Production Capacity 95.2 87.0 89.0
General Cost Breakdown 66.7 65.2 51.9
Process Steps Breakdown 57.1 100.0 95.6
Cost of Each Process Step 14.3 13.0 37.0
Quality Control Program 95.2 91.3 100.0
Stat. Process Control Data 90.5 47.8 66.7
Equipment Used 85.7 56.5 88.9
Inventory Level 57.1 52.2 44.4
Notes: *Differences between the 3 groups are significant at the 10% level
"hi-square test).
Differences between the 3 groups are significant at the 5% level.
Table 14: Suggestions Made by Automakers to Suppliers
Unit: percentage making suggestions in each category, number of
observations in parentheses
U.S. Japan Japan
/U.S.
(21) (23) (27)
Quality Control* 47.6 69.6 77.8
Production Process Changes 33.3 56.5 92.6
Cost Reduction 85.7 100.0 100.0
Design Changes 57.1 65.2 59.3
Material Changes * 33.3 69.6 48.2
Equipment Changes * 0 52.2 18.5
Inventory Control Changes 19.1 47.8 48.2
Notes: *Differences between the 3 groups are significant at the 10% level
"i-square test).
Differences between the 3 groups are significant at the 1% level.
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5. Summary of Results
Table 15 presents an overview of the major findings of the survey as they
relate to issues raised in the literature cited earlier in Table 1. In general, the
results support several of the reported differences between Japanese and U.S.
practices and performance in supplier management. In addition, they indicate
that, in key dimensions, Japanese transplants are managing suppliers much in
the same way as Japanese companies in Japan, as well as receiving similarly
high levels of performance, such as in defects and especially defect reductions,
even though approximately 87% of their suppliers were in the United States
(37% were independent U.S. firms, and 50% Japanese affiliates). There were,
nonetheless, several differences between the transplants and the Japanese
sample, reflecting the special circumstances and short histories of the
transplants but also the ability of the Japanese-managed plants to adapt to the
United States. Equally surprising, in several areas, the U.S. sample exhibited
practices that differed from the general views reported in the literature.
With regard to U.S.-Japan differences, as indicated in the literature, the
Japanese had fewer suppliers per part, longer contracts, decreasing prices,
extremely low defect rates, improving defect rates, and high levels of
information exchange with suppliers, including frequent offering of suggestions
for improvement. For supplier selection, the Japanese, somewhat surprisingly,
placed the highest emphasis on price; since relationships were clearly long-term
in Japan, respondents may not have felt a need to single out business contacts
or affiliation as major selection factors, although this result clearly illustrates
the importance Japanese firms placed on low prices from their suppliers, in
addition to high and improving quality.
The transplants closely resembled the Japanese in these dimensions but
departed significantly from Japanese practices in other areas. Unlike the
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Japanese, the transplants utilized many more suppliers based in the United
States, reflecting their locations; they had shorter part transactions, no doubt a
result of their briefer histories. They were very early in sending inquiries to
suppliers, no doubt reflecting again the newness of their operations. They had
much higher levels of detail-controlled parts, following the U.S. rather than the
Japanese practice, probably because they had not established sufficient
relationships with suppliers to delegate much detailed design. In addition, the
transplants closely resembled the U.S. sample with part prices approximately 10%
over target, compared to 2% below target in Japan. Particularly remarkable, the
transplants led the entire sample in the rate of improvement, with defects
dropping 30% since the model introductions, compared to decreases of 9.5% in
Japan and merely 1.7% for the U.S. sample. It is somewhat surprising that
suppliers were so far above the target prices for the transplants, although the
transplants also emphasized a combination of price and quality, and apparently
were willing to tolerate higher prices, at least temporarily, to receive higher
quality (higher, in fact, than U.S. automakers received from U.S. suppliers).
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Table 15: Summary of Main Survey Results
Dimension U.S. Japan/U. S. Japan
Number of Suppliers
Per Part
Type of Suppliers
Length of Relations
Length of Contracts
Length of Part
Transactions
In-House
and U.S.
Independents
Long
(> 10 yrs.)
Short
(1.7 yrs.)
Long
(3.2 yrs.)
Affiliated
U.S./Japan.,
U.S. Ind.
Short
(1-4 yrs.)
Longer
(2.5 yrs.)
Short
(1.6 yrs.)
Independent &
Affiliated
Japanese
Long
(> 10 yrs.)
Longest
(3.2 yrs.)
Longest
(3.5 yrs.)
Selection Criteria
(Emphasis)
Past contact,
affiliation
Role in Development Inquiries
at 30 months
& selection
at 26 months)
Inquiries
at 33 months
& selection
at 24 months)
Inquiries
at 27 months
& selection
at 23 months)
70% blackbox
30% detail-
controlled
64% blackbox
23% detail-
controlled
96% blackbox
Pricing Practices
Price Changes
Above Target
(109%)
Increasing
(+0.9%)
Above Target
(110%)
Decreasing
(-0.4%)
Below Target
(98%)
Decreasing
(-2.1%)
Defect Rates
Defect Rate Change Decreasing
(-1.7%)
Decreasing
(-30.1%)
Decreasing
(-9.5%)
Information Exchanges Low, mainly
statistical
process
control
Higher,
more on
process
steps
Higher,
more on
process steps,
and costs
Supplier Suggestions
Most
(1.8)
Fewest
(1.2)
Fewer
(1.3)
Price &
quality
Price
High
(1.81%)
Low
(0.05%)
Lowest
(0.01%)
Few Many Many
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Since this study examined supplier-management practices as they existed in
1990 and were maintained for current models, they do not show what practices
or performance levels used to be. Nonetheless, if the literature cited earlier
provided an accurate indication of traditional U.S. practices, then this survey
indicates that U.S. firms, at least in a few areas, have moved closer to
Japanese practices emphasizing long-term relationships and early cooperation in
development. Length of relations with suppliers were very long in the United
States as well as in Japan, usually more than 10 years. The length of part
transactions was nearly as long for the U.S. as for the Japanese sample, both
corresponding closely to the model life-cycle. U.S. firms also emphasized past
contacts with suppliers (in additional to financial affiliations) when selecting
suppliers, rather than price. In addition, U.S. automakers sent out inquiries and
selected suppliers earlier than the Japanese and the transplants, although the
U.S. automakers still controlled more detailed product development, especially
compared to the Japanese, for this sample of components.
6. Implications
The survey findings suggest several implications, with relevance for general
management practice as well as for U.S.-Japanese competition. First, Japanese
auto transplants came close to matching the practices and performance levels of
Japanese auto plants in Japan for several key areas, such as few suppliers per
part, relatively long contracts, decreasing prices, low defect rates, rapidly
decreasing rates of defects, and high levels of information exchange and
suggestions made to suppliers. Managing in this style and obtaining such
results from their U.S. suppliers provides evidence that management policies and
practices, rather than the national origin or location of suppliers, are probably
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the most important sources of differences in how suppliers operate and perform.
This data thus provides quantitative support for a growing stream of literature
that associates "good practice" with Japanese management and argues that the
kinds of practices or supplier relationships Japanese firms have adopted can well
in national settings outside Japan (Schonberger 1982; Abegglen and Stalk 1984;
Cusumano 1988; Krafcik 1988; Clark 1989).
Second, on the competitive level, the data indicate that automakers in the
United States and their major suppliers still need to improve in order to match
the pricing and quality levels of suppliers to Japanese automakers based in
Japan as well as in the United States. Not only do Japanese firms appear to
receive lower target prices and higher quality from their Japanese suppliers, but
these suppliers also appear better at reducing prices and defects. The laudable
performance of U.S. suppliers to the Japanese auto transplants, however, leads
to the conclusion that U.S. suppliers should be able to perform better at least
In quality than they have in the past with U.S. automakers. The average defect
rate of U.S. suppliers to the transplants still lagged that of Japanese suppliers
to the transplants, but appeared much better than for U.S. automakers. It
follows that the establishment of Japanese auto plants and other factories in
the United States, to the extent that they persuade or help U.S. suppliers
achieve higher levels of performance, may be a positive stimulus for U.S.
industry and a boon to U.S. consumers.
Third, Japanese transplants, while demonstrating that superior performance
from U.S. suppliers is possible, themselves have room to improve, both in their
relationships with U.S. suppliers and with Japanese-owned suppliers in the
United States. The transplants trailed their Japanese parents in quality and,
especially, target pricing, although suppliers to the transplants were improving
quality levels at an astounding rate. While they also involved fewer suppliers
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in engineering or design, this seemed likely to change as Japanese automakers
shifted more of their product-development operations to the United States.
Further research is needed to continue tracking the performance of
suppliers to Japanese as well as U.S. auto producers. For example, this survey
focused on relationships around a few current models, yet analyzing
relationships among companies over multiple products and transactions, rather
than transactions for a single part, can illustrate the dynamic pattern of
relationships between buyers and suppliers. Nor did this survey compare design
quality or innovation and the technological level of parts; these factors are
difficult to measure but may be as or more critical to the market performance
of finished products than part pricing or defect levels.
Extending the scope of this kind of study to include more types of parts,
and producers and suppliers in Europe as well a in the United States and
Japan, would add further breadth to the research and the results. In addition,
it remained beyond the objective of this project to explore factors behind
national or firm-level differences in practice and performance, or systematic
interrelationships among variables. This survey also analyzed supplier
relationships from the perspective of leading U.S. and Japanese automakers.
While interviews with suppliers supported the accuracy of data reported by
managers, to explore more fully the reciprocal and dynamic aspects of supplier
management, future comparisons of Japanese and U.S. management practices and
performance might ask questions similar to those in this study but directed at
the suppliers themselves. Finally, to test the generality of the results seen in
this survey, it would be necessary to examine supplier-management practices and
performance measures for firms in industries other than automobiles.
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Appendix 1: Sample by Model Segment and Annual Volume
Units: Number of models, percentages in parentheses
U.S. Japan Japan Total
/U.S.
Segment:
Subcompact 3 8 8 19
(14.3) (33.3) (29.6) (26.4)
Compact 4 16 15 35
(19.1) (66.7) (55.6) (48.6)
Mid-Size 10 0 0 4
(47.6) (0) (0) (5.6)
Full-Size 4 0 0 4
(19.1) (0) (0) (5.6)
Annual Production:
< 100,000 4 4 4 12
(19.1) (16.7) (14.8) (16.7)
100,000-200,000 3 16 11 30
(14.3) (66.7) (40.7) (41.7)
200,000-300,000 12 4 4 20
(57.1) (16.7) (14.8) (27.8)
300,000-400,000 2 0 8 10
(9.5) (0) (29.6) (1.4)
Total 21 24 27 72
(100) (100) (100) (100)
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Appendix 2: Data Sensitivity and Reliability
As in any survey of this type, there exist concerns about both the
sensitivity of the data to foreseen as well as unforeseen biases or interactions
among variables, and the reliability of the respondents. We included several
measures to explore these possibilities, and conclude that, with only a few
exceptions, the data for the three groups appear statistically robust as well as
comparable.
First, we were concerned that our selection of four components might
have biased the results. If automakers in the three groups systematically
managed these parts differently, the survey results might reflect management
policies generally consistent for all components or merely differences related to
the type of components. There were a few cases where the type of part
proved a significant variable in the analyses; however, as noted in Section 4,
these were not common and did not affect the general results or conclusions of
the survey.
Another concern was that, while we chose the components, respondents
would choose models from different segments that would complicate an
interpretation of the answers. For this reason, we asked for information on the
model segments as well as production volumes (Appendix 1). As we suspected,
the model mix differed; U.S. automakers reported on more full-size and mid-size
vehicles, and the Japanese and transplants on more subcompact and compact
vehicles. The U.S. models also had higher average annual production volumes,
which might indicate a general bias toward mass production and low costs.
However, analysis of variance (ANOVA) and chi-square tests for cross tabulation
indicated that, while some minor differences existed, they did not affect the
results reported in Section 4.
For example, information on inventory levels differed by model segments,
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where the Japanese and transplants reported on more subcompacts than other
types of models. Differences among the three groups were not significant,
however, including or excluding subcompacts. Suggestions regarding quality
control also differed by model segment, although excluding the mid-size and
full-size vehicles, which were mainly in the U.S. sample and had lower rates of
suggestions, the U.S. ratio remained significantly lower than for the other two
groups. Other variables (suggestions about design changes, quality control, and
inventory control) proved to be sensitive to model segment but did not affect
the general results of the analysis. Eliminating full-size models from the
analysis also reduced the difference between the average price-change rates for
the U.S. group and the transplants to a level slightly below the 10% confidence
interval, although the difference between the U.S. and Japan responses remained
significant at the 1% level.
With regard to production volume, only a few variables proved to be
sensitive to this attribute, and thus most results of the survey were unaffected.
For example, while the importance attached to the initial price as a selection
criterion for suppliers differed by production volume, the Japanese still placed
more importance on this variable than the U.S. or transplant samples except for
the 300,000 to 400,000 units-per-year segment, where both the Japanese and
U.S. respondents strongly emphasized this variable. In the 200,000 to 300,000-
unit segment, the emphasis of the transplants on this criterion was not
statistically higher than the Japanese respondents. Possession of statistical
process-control data, as well as suggestions regarding changes in materials,
equipment, and inventory control, also showed some sensitivity to production
volume, with a few significant differences becoming insignificant for particular
volume segments. The reason for these results seems to be that U.S.
automakers managed and performed more comparably to the Japanese and the
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transplants in their model lines with production levels below 200,000. However,
including the volume segments above 200,000, which accounted for the majority
(nearly 67%) of the U.S. models, the differences presented in Section 4 remain
significant.
To gain a sense of the reliability of the data, we compared information in
the survey with data from other researchers and our own interviews, and
several times asked respondents to clarify or amend their answers (we found
several mistakes that were obvious because the data did not make sense or were
radically different from other respondents). In addition, for each question in
the survey, we asked respondents to indicate their confidence in their answers
on a three-point scale (1 = very confident, 2 = somewhat confident, 3 = not
very confident). Of the 17 separate questions in the survey, in four instances
each, the U.S. and transplant respondents had significantly less confidence than
the Japanese respondents. This suggests that the data they reported for these
questions may not be entirely accurate, although only in one instance did the
average response from one of the groups appear to be "not very confident."
The U.S. group proved slightly less confident (1.3 score, different at the
10% significance level) than the Japanese and the transplants on one question
asking when they started purchasing from a particular supplier and on another
question asking at what stage in development they selected suppliers (1.67
score, significant at 5%). Both the U.S. and the transplant respondents were
less confident than the Japanese regarding defect rates (1.9 score for the U.S.,
significant at 5%; 1.8 for the transplants, significant at 10%) and defect rate
changes over time (2.6 score for the U.S., significant at 1%; 2.3 for the
transplants, significant at 5%). The transplant respondents were also
significantly less confident (at the 5% or 1% levels) in their answers, compared
to both the U.S. and Japanese respondents, on two other questions: the type of
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information possessed on suppliers (1.7 score), and the type of suggestions made
to suppliers (1.6 score).
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